Eliminating Standard Pleading Forms that Require Prisoners to Allege Their Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies by Gullett, Broc
ELIMINATING STANDARD PLEADING FORMS 
THAT REQUIRE PRISONERS TO ALLEGE THEIR 
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
REMEDIES 
Broc Gullett*
2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1179 
ABSTRACT
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) establishes that 
prisoners must exhaust all available administrative remedies before 
filing a lawsuit. The PLRA also imposes a negative consequence—
what is commonly referred to as a “strike”—when a court dismisses 
a prisoner’s lawsuit because it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to 
state a claim. Before 2007, some federal circuit courts disagreed 
about whether the PLRA required prisoners to allege the exhaustion 
of administrative remedies in their complaints. Such a requirement 
would make any complaint failing to allege exhaustion tantamount to 
a complaint failing to state a claim and, therefore, grounds for a 
PLRA strike.  
The United States Supreme Court settled the debate when it 
held in Jones v. Bock that prisoners are not required to allege 
exhaustion in their complaints. In so holding, the Court explicitly 
placed the burden on defendants to plead a prisoner’s failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies as an affirmative defense. Despite 
the Court’s holding in Bock, many federal district courts are still 
placing this burden on prisoners—requiring them to allege their 
exhaustion of administrative remedies by having them file pro forma 
complaints that include questions asking if they have exhausted their 
administrative remedies. The forms with these questions force 
prisoners to reveal in their complaints the affirmative defense of 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Because a finding of an 
affirmative defense—in this case, a failure to exhaust administrative 
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remedies—on the face of a complaint is grounds for a failure to state 
a claim, a prisoner using such a complaint form may have his 
complaint dismissed for failure to state a claim and will therefore 
incur a PLRA strike. Three PLRA strikes may foreclose the prisoner 
from accessing the courts in the future.  
To prevent this unintended and unjust consequence, a public-
interest group should litigate on behalf of a prisoner being forced to 
use a pro forma complaint that asks him about his exhaustion of 
administrative remedies. Because the portions of the pro forma 
complaints that ask about exhaustion are inconsistent with Rule 8 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and unlawfully abridge 
prisoners’ substantive rights under the Rules Enabling Act, the 
group should seek to eliminate the parts of the pro forma complaints 
that ask prisoners about their exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
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“It is said that no one truly knows a nation until one has 
been inside its jails. A nation should not be judged by 
how it treats its highest citizens, but its lowest ones.”
—Nelson Mandela
INTRODUCTION
Nationally, federal district courts have been inconsistent in how 
they handle civil rights lawsuits brought by prisoners who have been 
unable to exhaust administrative remedies.1 The Prison Litigation 
Reform Act (PLRA) establishes that prisoners must exhaust all 
available administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit.2 The PLRA 
also imposes a negative consequence3—what is commonly referred 
to as a “strike”—when a court dismisses a prisoner’s lawsuit because 
it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim.4 Before 2007, some 
federal circuit courts disagreed about whether the PLRA required 
prisoners to allege the exhaustion of administrative remedies in their 
complaints.5 Such a requirement would make any complaint failing 
to allege exhaustion6 tantamount to a complaint failing to state a 
claim and, therefore, grounds for a PLRA strike.7 However, the 
                                                     
1. See discussion infra Part II.  
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012). 
3. The PLRA amended 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) so that a prisoner accruing 
three “strikes” under the PLRA is disqualified from proceeding with in forma 
pauperis status (IFP Status). 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012); see also Ball v. Famiglio, 
726 F.3d 448, 451 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining that a prisoner may not proceed with 
IFP Status if “she ha[s] accrued three ‘strikes’ under the PLRA”).  
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (2012). 
5. See discussion infra Part II.  
6. For the sake of clarity and pithiness, this Note uses various forms of the 
phrase “exhaustion of administrative remedies,” including “exhaust,” “exhaustion,” 
and “failure to exhaust.” All versions of this phrase carry the same meaning and 
weight as the full version. 
7. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
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United States Supreme Court settled the debate when it held in Jones 
v. Bock8 that prisoners are not required to allege exhaustion in their 
complaints.9 In so holding, the Court explicitly placed the burden on 
defendants to plead a prisoner’s failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies as an affirmative defense.10
Despite the Court’s holding in Bock, many federal district 
courts are still placing this burden on prisoners—requiring them to 
allege their exhaustion of administrative remedies by having them 
file pro forma complaints11 that include questions asking if they have 
exhausted their administrative remedies.12 The forms with these 
questions force prisoners to reveal in their complaints the affirmative 
defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.13 Because a 
finding of an affirmative defense—in this case, a failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies—on the face of a complaint is grounds for a 
failure to state a claim,14 a prisoner using such a complaint form may 
have his complaint dismissed for failure to state a claim and will 
therefore incur a PLRA strike.15 Three PLRA strikes may foreclose 
the prisoner from accessing the courts in the future.16 To prevent this 
unintended and unjust consequence, a public-interest group17 should 
litigate on behalf of a prisoner being forced to use a pro forma 
complaint that asks him about his exhaustion of administrative 
remedies.18 Because the portions of the pro forma complaints that ask 
about exhaustion are inconsistent with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and unlawfully abridge prisoners’ substantive rights 
under the Rules Enabling Act,19 the group should seek to eliminate 
                                                     
8. 549 U.S. 199 (2007). 
9. Id. at 214 (stating that nothing in the PLRA “explicitly or implicitly . . . 
justif[ies] deviating from the usual procedural practice”).
10. Id. at 216 (concluding “that [a] failure to exhaust is an affirmative 
defense under the PLRA”).
11. Pro forma complaints are complaints prepared in advance for prisoners. 
See Pro Forma, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also discussion
infra Section IV.A. (providing examples of pro forma complaints). 
12. See discussion infra Section III.A.  
13. See discussion infra Section III.A. 
14. Bock, 549 U.S. at 215. 
15. See discussion infra Section III.A.  
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012). 
17. For example, the American Civil Liberties Union advocates for 
prisoners. Prisoners’ Rights, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/ 
prisoners-rights (last visited Oct. 6, 2015). 
18. See discussion infra Part IV. 
19. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (2012).
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the parts of the pro forma complaints that ask prisoners about their 
exhaustion of administrative remedies.20
Part I of this Note discusses the history of the PLRA, including 
a brief history of prison litigation and relevant political trends 
leading up to the PLRA. Part II discusses germane parts of the 
PLRA, a circuit split that developed regarding whether the PLRA 
requires prisoners to allege exhaustion in their complaints, and the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Bock that resolved that circuit 
split. Part III illustrates the problem with court-mandated pro forma 
complaints that has developed in the wake of Jones v. Bock, followed 
by a discussion of limitations to courts’ power to create local rules, 
such as the rules mandating the pro forma complaints. Part IV 
explains how a public-interest group should litigate to eliminate 
exhaustion questions from pro forma complaints on the basis that 
they are inconsistent with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and unlawfully abridge prisoners’ substantive rights to
access the courts.  
I. PRISONERS’ RIGHTS BEFORE THE PLRA 
Concerns over the civil rights of prisoners have motivated 
significant legal changes since the beginning of the Civil Rights 
Movement.21 Starting in the 1960s, the Supreme Court began 
establishing that prisoners should have some basic rights.22 In 1980, 
Congress passed the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act23
(CRIPA), a law that completely overhauled the process by which 
prisoners could gain access to the federal courts.24 Fifteen years later, 
swelling political pressure forced Congress to overhaul prison 
litigation once again by enacting the PLRA.25
                                                     
20. See discussion infra Section IV.B. 
21. See discussion infra Section I.A.  
22. Edgardo Rotman, The Failure of Reform: United States, 1865–1965, in
THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN 
SOCIETY 169, 192-93 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995). 
23. Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 
Stat. 349 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997-1997j (2012)). 
24. See discussion infra Section I.B (discussing the changes Congress 
implemented with CRIPA). 
25. See discussion infra Section I.C (discussing the political landscape 
before Congress enacted the PLRA).  
1184 Michigan State Law Review  2015:1179 
A. Prison Litigation in the Federal Courts Prior to the PLRA  
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, courts began implementing 
what was known as the “Open-Door Policy”26 as the Supreme Court 
rendered decisions guaranteeing prisoners more rights.27 In 1964, the 
Supreme Court held in Cooper v. Pate that prisoners could sue 
government actors for civil rights violations if the prisoners could 
show that the government actors were acting under color of law.28
The change in Cooper marked the beginning of a trend29 leading to 
the Court’s eventual determination that prisoners have a right to 
access the courts to vindicate their constitutional rights.30
During the same time period, major societal changes and 
deteriorating prison conditions pressured policymakers to reform 
prisons.31 During the 1960s, the Civil Rights Movement was gaining 
momentum, and prisoners were among the deprived groups that civil 
rights activists were assisting.32 Meanwhile, prisons were becoming 
overcrowded and understaffed, leading to potentially dangerous 
situations.33 With the new wave of civil rights activists and
overcrowding prisons, policymakers were forced to make changes.34
                                                     
26. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING 
PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 30-31 (1980).  
27. Id. at 31 (citing landmark Supreme Court decisions that guaranteed 
prisoners the right to have access to the courts, the right to due process during some 
disciplinary proceedings, the right to equal protection under the law, and the right 
not to be subjected to conditions of confinement amounting to cruel and unusual 
punishment).  
28. See 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964).  
29. See Barbara Belbot, Where Can a Prisoner Find a Liberty Interest 
These Days? The Pains of Imprisonment Escalate, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1, 1 
(1998) (noting the Supreme Court’s increased openness to prisoners’ constitutional 
claims after 1964).  
30. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974) (“When a prison 
regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts 
will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights.”), overruled on other 
grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1989).  
31. LYNN S. BRANHAM, AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION,
LIMITING THE BURDENS OF PRO SE INMATE LITIGATION: A TECHNICAL-ASSISTANCE 
MANUAL FOR COURTS, CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS, AND ATTORNEYS GENERAL 20 
(1997) (noting that there were several events forcing courts to face the issue of 
prison conditions and prisoners’ civil rights). 
32. See id. (discussing the Civil Rights Movement). 
33. See id. at 20-21 (discussing events causing increasing pressure for 
change in prison conditions, one of which was a 1971 riot at Attica State Prison in 
New York that resulted in forty-three deaths). 
34. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 26, at 24-26. 
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A shift occurred at the beginning of the 1970s with the 
introduction of state-mandated inmate grievance procedures.35 In a 
1970 speech to the National Association of Attorneys General, Chief
Justice Warren Burger advocated for the use of prison grievance 
procedures.36 In response to Chief Justice Burger’s speech, state 
correctional departments introduced inmate grievance procedures,
commonly referred to as administrative remedies, in the years that 
followed.37 Unfortunately, the creation of these administrative 
remedies was widely ineffective to solve the problem of flooded 
courts, primarily because the Supreme Court held that courts had no 
authority to require the exhaustion of certain administrative 
remedies, especially when deprivations of prisoners’ civil rights were 
in question.38 While prisoners had reasonable access to the courts at 
that time, Congress was about to construct an administrative wall to 
greatly inhibit their access.39
B. Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act 
In 1980, Congress enacted CRIPA as an attempt to overhaul 
prison conditions and increase the utility of prison grievance 
procedures.40 CRIPA gave attorneys general the power to bring 
lawsuits to remedy “‘egregious or flagrant conditions’ in prisons”
and the power to intervene in pending suits related to similar issues.41
However, another part of CRIPA required prisoners to exhaust 
certain administrative remedies before they could access the federal 
                                                     
35. See Adam Slutsky, Note, Totally Exhausted: Why a Strict Interpretation 
of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) Unduly Burdens Courts and Prisoners, 73 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2289, 2293 (2005) (explaining that Justice Warren Burger’s speech to the 
National Association of Attorneys General sparked change in the prison systems).  
36. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Speech to the National Association of 
Attorneys General in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 8, 1970), in FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra
note 26, at 24. 
37. Slutsky, supra note 35, at 2293.  
38. Id. at 2293-94 (explaining that key decisions “‘open[ed] [the] door’ to 
federal courts”).
39. See discussion infra Section I.B.  
40. See Lynn S. Branham, The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Enigmatic 
Exhaustion Requirement: What It Means and What Congress, Courts and 
Correctional Officials Can Learn From It, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 483, 493 (2001) 
(citing “widespread atrocities and violations of the constitutional rights of” prisoners 
and others).  
41. Id. at 494 (explaining the power CRIPA conferred to the U.S. Attorney 
General).  
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courts.42 Despite some significant criticism, Congress apparently 
added the exhaustion provision as a counterbalance to parts of 
CRIPA that would inevitably increase the volume of prisoner civil 
rights cases in the federal courts.43 With the added provision, 
Congress hoped to mitigate some of the burden on federal courts by 
providing state and local officials the chance to remedy 
constitutional violations before the courts had to intervene.44
At first, the burden from CRIPA’s exhaustion requirement was 
limited.45 CRIPA required a prisoner’s exhaustion only in instances 
that were “appropriate and in the interests of justice.”46 Further, if a 
court decided to require the exhaustion of administrative remedies, 
rather than dismissing the action, the court would stay the 
proceedings for up to ninety days, at which point it would resume the 
proceedings if necessary.47 While CRIPA changed the way prisoners 
attempted to vindicate their rights, the public’s perception of prison 
litigation was also changing.48
C. Increased Prisoners and Increased Litigation 
From 1980 to 1995, the number of inmates in state prisons 
increased dramatically, and so did the number of civil rights lawsuits 
filed by state prisoners in federal courts.49 In 1980, there were 12,397 
state prisoners who filed civil rights lawsuits in federal courts, and 
this number increased to 40,569 in 1995, an increase of 227%.50
However, the seemingly dramatic increase in civil rights litigation by 
prisoners was proportionately less than the 237% increase in the 
number of prisoners in state prisons over the same period of time.51
Thus, the per capita rate of state prisoners filing suits in federal 
                                                     
42. Id. at 494-95. 
43. See id. at 495 & n.49 (citing opponents’ arguments against having an 
exhaustion requirement). 
44. See id. at 495.
45. Id. at 494-96 (outlining the specific situations where the federal court 
could require a prisoner’s exhaustion of administrative remedies). 
46. Id. at 495 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1) (1994)).
47. Id. at 495-96.  
48. See discussion infra Section I.C.  
49. See Slutsky, supra note 35, at 2294.  
50. See BRANHAM, supra note 31, at 21 (providing various statistics 
regarding prison litigation after 1980).  
51. Id. at 21-22.
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courts actually dropped “from 40.7 suits per thousand state prisoners 
in 1980 to 39.4 suits per thousand state prisoners in 1995.”52
Despite the proportional stability of civil rights suits brought by 
state prisoners in the federal courts from 1980 to 1995, the National 
Association of Attorneys General and others used the increased 
litigation as a catalyst for their own agendas.53 The National 
Association of Attorneys General manipulated statistics to support its 
agenda and produced a press release that showed a 22% increase in 
lawsuits brought by state prisoners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,54
shrewdly choosing not to mention that the number of prisoners had 
increased by 62% over the same period of time.55 Republicans in 
Congress and attorneys general around the country spearheaded a 
media campaign featuring top-ten frivolous lawsuits lists to create 
public disdain for prisoner–litigants.56 The classic example of a 
frivolous suit featured in one of these lists was a prisoner 
complaining over having received chunky peanut butter rather than 
creamy peanut butter.57 While anecdotes were an effective media tool 
used to stir up public criticism for prisoners using the federal courts,
there is serious doubt as to the veracity of these tales.58
Chief Judge John O. Newman of the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals explained, after his brief research, that there was a media 
push to denigrate the civil rights of prisoners.59 Judge Newman 
explained that the lawsuit supposedly over peanut butter was actually 
                                                     
52. Slutsky, supra note 35, at 2295 (citing BRANHAM, supra note 31, at 21-
22).
53. See id. at 2295-97 (discussing executive organizations campaigning to 
change the way prisoners litigate).  
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). Section 1983 provides grounds for a civil
action for “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and [its] laws.” Id.  
55. Damn Lies and Statistics, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Apr. 15, 1996), 
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/1996/apr/15/damn-lies-and-statistics/. 
56. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Exhaustion Under the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act: The Consequence of Procedural Error, 52 EMORY L.J. 1771, 1776-77
(2003) (claiming that the aggressive media campaign from Republicans in Congress 
and attorneys general engendered the negative public perception of the prison 
litigation situation).
57. Slutsky, supra note 35, at 2296. 
58. See Jon O. Newman, Not All Prisoner Lawsuits Are Frivolous, PRISON 
LEGAL NEWS (Apr. 15, 1996), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/1996/apr/15/ 
not-all-prisoner-lawsuits-are-frivolous/ (discussing the veracity of anecdotes about 
frivolous prison litigation). 
59. See id. (explaining that a few attorneys general either fabricated stories 
or took them out of context when giving examples of frivolous lawsuits that were 
supposedly representative of many other prisoners’ suits).  
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a prisoner suing for money the prison owed him.60 He went on to 
debunk two similar claims from the attorneys general.61 In exposing 
the truth about these anecdotes, Judge Newman astutely opined that 
government officials should not be creating myths to disparage 
prisoners.62
Despite Judge Newman’s efforts, the stories of frivolous prison 
litigation provided a political fulcrum for the ambitious, newly 
Republican Congress.63 In 1994, Republicans published their 
“Contract with America,” in which the party promised that Congress 
would strive for tougher, more conservative values.64 Eager to meet 
its promises, the newly Republican Congress welcomed the 
overabundance of prison litigation as an easy target for an exhibition 
of anti-criminal toughness, and the scene was set for the inception of 
the PLRA.65
D. The PLRA 
The available legislative history for the PLRA is sparse.66 In 
light of the growing criticism of frivolous suits by prisoners,67
                                                     
60. Id. (“He sued because, after the correctional officer quite willingly took 
back the wrong product and assured him that the item he had ordered would be sent 
the next day, the authorities transferred the prisoner that night to another prison, and 
his account remained charged $2.50 for the item that he ordered but never 
received.”).
61. See id. (explaining that a lawsuit supposedly over the color of towels 
was actually over the confiscation of towels sent to a prisoner by his family and that 
a complaint supposedly about a salad bar was actually a twenty-seven-page 
complaint alleging several major violations). 
62. Id. (“[T]hose in responsible positions ought not to ridicule all prisoner 
lawsuits by perpetuating myths about them.”).
63. Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1566 
(2003) (explaining that the National Associations of Attorneys General and the 
National District Attorneys Association put the PLRA on Congress’s agenda). 
64. See generally U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPUBLICAN 
CONTRACT WITH AMERICA (n.d.), http://media.mcclatchydc.com/static/pdf/1994-
contract-with-america.pdf. 
65. See Schlanger, supra note 63, at 1567 (“In the first heady days of 
Republican control of both chambers of Congress, prisoners made awfully attractive 
targets—and Republican leaders vying for support from the party faithful were 
happy to outbid one another in anti-criminal toughness.”).
66. See Branham, supra note 40, at 501 (discussing the PLRA’s limited 
legislative history). 
67. See Slutsky, supra note 35, at 2297-98. 
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Congress moved hastily for its passage.68 The touted purpose of the 
PLRA was to relieve the judicial system by mitigating the amount of 
frivolous litigation.69 Unfortunately, Congress was so quick to pass 
the PLRA that it even got the name wrong, naming it the “Prison 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995” when “it was actually passed in 
1996.”70 While the time it took to pass the PLRA was short, it 
brought significant changes to prison litigation.71
Similar to CRIPA’s exhaustion mandate, § 1997e(a) of the 
PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies before 
bringing lawsuits over prison conditions in a federal court.72
However, where CRIPA provided courts with discretion to require 
the exhaustion of administrative remedies only where it was 
“appropriate and in the interests of justice,”73 the PLRA’s exhaustion 
requirement is mandatory.74 For example, in Booth v. Churner, a
prisoner argued that there should be no exhaustion requirement when 
the administrative remedies cannot possibly provide the type of relief 
sought, but the Court held that prisoners are required to exhaust all 
available administrative remedies, even if the remedies provide no 
basis for the relief the prisoners are seeking.75 While the new, strict 
exhaustion requirement is a key component of the PLRA, another 
                                                     
68. Ngo v. Woodford, 403 F.3d 620, 623 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he 
PLRA’s sparse legislative history primarily consists of PLRA proponents parroting 
the frivolous cases compiled by the National Association of Attorneys General. 
Sadly, several of the most widely cited cases of frivolous prisoner lawsuits were 
mischaracterized by the proponents of the PLRA.” (citation omitted)), rev’d on 
other grounds, 548 U.S. 81, 87 (2006). 
69. 141 CONG. REC. S14,626-27 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of 
Sen. Hatch). 
70. Susan N. Herman, Slashing and Burning Prisoners’ Rights: Congress 
and the Supreme Court in Dialogue, 77 OR. L. REV. 1229, 1277 (1988) (“[The 
PLRA’s] provisions . . . bear many signs of the haste . . . . Key terms were not 
defined, some provisions conflicted with preexisting law, and even the title could 
have used editing: entitled the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, it was actually 
passed in 1996.” (footnotes omitted)).
71. See Branham, supra note 40, at 493-98 (discussing changes resulting 
from the PLRA). 
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012). 
73. Branham, supra note 40, at 495 (explaining CRIPA’s exhaustion 
requirements).  
74. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002) (discussing that all available 
administrative remedies must be exhausted, regardless of whether they meet any 
federal standards). 
75. 532 U.S. 731, 732 (2001) (“Congress meant to require procedural 
exhaustion regardless of the fit between a prisoner’s prayer for relief and the 
administrative remedies possible.”).
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provision in the PLRA has also significantly changed litigation for 
prisoners.76
Section 1997e(c) of the PLRA imposes consequences for 
prisoners repeatedly bringing claims without merit.77 First, a federal 
court is required to dismiss a prisoner’s lawsuit sua sponte if the 
court determines “the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief 
from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”78 If a court 
dismisses a prisoner’s claim for one of the four prescribed reasons, 
the prisoner will incur what is known as a PLRA strike.79 A prisoner 
incurring three such dismissals—three strikes—is barred from 
claiming in forma pauperis filing status (IFP Status).80 IFP Status is a 
status that has been created by Congress to allow indigent citizens—
including prisoners—to temporarily forgo the payment of filing 
fees.81 Therefore, if a prisoner has thrice had claims dismissed 
because they are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek 
monetary relief from someone who is immune from such relief, then 
a prisoner will be ineligible for IFP Status and will therefore have no 
access to the courts if he cannot afford to pay a filing fee.82
Congress’s passage of the PLRA completely changed the face 
of prison litigation.83 Prisoners are now required to exhaust all 
                                                     
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (mandating that prisoners’ meritless claims be 
dismissed sua sponte). 
77. Id.
78. Id. (“The court shall on its own motion or on the motion of a party 
dismiss any action brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of 
this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other 
correctional facility if the court is satisfied that the action is frivolous, malicious, 
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from 
a defendant who is immune from such relief.”).  
79. Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining the 
PLRA’s “three strikes” rule). 
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012) (“In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil 
action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section [i.e., 
proceed in forma pauperis] if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while 
incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the 
United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or 
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under 
imminent danger of serious physical injury.”); see also Famiglio, 726 F.3d at 452 
(explaining the interaction of the PLRA with the in forma pauperis statute). 
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a); see also Famiglio, 726 F.3d at 452 (explaining 
that IFP Status allows indigent prisoners to access the courts). 
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); see also Famiglio, 726 F.3d at 452 (explaining the 
consequences of the “three strikes” provision). 
83. See supra notes 72-82 and accompanying text. 
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administrative remedies that are available.84 Indigent prisoners are 
now unable to use IFP Status to access the courts if on three or more 
occasions they have had claims dismissed on grounds that the claims 
are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary relief 
from a defendant who is immune from such relief.85 In light of these 
changes, courts are still struggling to interpret various parts of the 
PLRA.86
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT LEADING UP TO JONES V. BOCK
After approximately twenty years of applying the PLRA, 
federal circuit courts disagreed about whether prisoners were 
required to allege their exhaustion of administrative remedies in their 
complaints.87 Specifically, the Sixth,88 Tenth,89 and Eleventh90 circuits 
held that if a judge found that a prisoner failed to plead exhaustion,
the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim91—the 
prisoner incurring a PLRA strike with such a result.92 Meanwhile, the 
First,93 Second,94 Third,95 Fourth,96 Seventh,97 Eighth,98 and Ninth99
circuits held that a prisoner’s failure to exhaust should be treated as 
an affirmative defense, which, if invoked by a defendant, would not 
                                                     
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012). 
85. Id. § 1997e(c); see also supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
86. See discussion infra Part II.  
87. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 205-06 (2007) (explaining the circuit split 
regarding whether prisoners are required to allege exhaustion in their complaints).  
88. Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) 
(holding that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is a pleading requirement), 
abrogated by Bock, 549 U.S. at 216. 
89. Steele v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 355 F.3d 1204, 1210 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(same), abrogated by Bock, 549 U.S. at 216. 
90. Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 731 (11th Cir. 1998) (same), abrogated 
by Bock, 549 U.S. at 216. 
91. Bock, 549 U.S. at 205-06 (explaining the circuit split). 
92. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (2012); see also Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 
452 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining the “three strikes” provision). 
93. Casanova v. Dubois, 304 F.3d 75, 77 n.3 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that a 
failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense). 
94. Snider v. Melindez, 199 F.3d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1999) (same). 
95. Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002) (same). 
96. Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 681 (4th Cir. 
2005) (same). 
97. Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 735 (7th Cir. 1999) (same). 
98. Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687, 697 (8th Cir. 2001) (same). 
99. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (same). 
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result in the prisoner incurring a PLRA strike.100 In 2007, the 
Supreme Court settled the circuit split with its landmark case Jones 
v. Bock.101 Siding with the majority of circuits, the Court held that a 
prisoner’s exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a pleading 
requirement in prisoners’ complaints, but rather an affirmative 
defense that defendants must plead.102 Consequently, a prisoner 
failing to allege exhaustion should not have his complaint dismissed 
for failure to state a claim and should not incur a PLRA strike.103
However, the Court explained in its dictum that if a complaint 
reveals an affirmative defense on its face—even the affirmative 
defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies—the complaint 
should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.104 This procedural 
rule, in conjunction with local federal district court rules, has led to 
other problems for prisoners.105
A. Minority View: Circuits Viewing Exhaustion as a Pleading 
Requirement 
An account of the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Steele v. Federal 
Bureau of Prisons106 will illustrate the minority view leading up to 
Jones v. Bock.107 In Steele, Steele filed a claim in the United States 
Federal District Court for the District of Colorado under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act but did not commence the separate administrative 
grievance procedure.108 He argued that inmates could not access the 
grievance procedure because the first step depended on cooperation 
from a staff member.109 A magistrate judge recommended a dismissal 
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, citing no applicable 
                                                     
100. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012) (providing types of dismissals that may 
disqualify a prisoner for IFP Status, but making no mention of affirmative defenses). 
101. 549 U.S. 199 (2007). 
102. Id. at 216 (“We conclude that failure to exhaust is an affirmative 
defense under the PLRA, and that inmates are not required to specially plead or 
demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.”).
103. See id. (holding that prisoners should not have their claims dismissed 
for failure to state a claim—which would have been a reason for a PLRA strike—if 
they fail to allege exhaustion).  
104. Id. at 215-16 (explaining that a failure to exhaust should be treated as a 
normal affirmative defense). 
105. See discussion infra Part III. 
106. 355 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2003). 
107. 549 U.S. at 205-06 (explaining the minority view). 
108. Steele, 355 F.3d at 1206. 
109. Id. at 1207.  
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procedural rule.110 The district court followed the recommendation by 
dismissing the action for failure to state a claim,111 which provided 
grounds for a PLRA strike against Steele.112 On appeal, the Tenth 
Circuit affirmed the dismissal for failure to state a claim.113 Noting 
that affirmative defenses are waived if they are not timely brought,114
the court reasoned that exhaustion could not be an affirmative 
defense because it was mandatory and therefore could not be waived 
under the PLRA.115 Consequently, the court held that exhaustion was 
a pleading requirement, rather than an affirmative defense,116
maintaining the rule that a prisoner failing to plead exhaustion would 
have his complaint dismissed for failure to state a claim, which is 
grounds for a PLRA strike.117
B. Majority View: Circuits Viewing Exhaustion as an Affirmative 
Defense 
An account of the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Anderson v. XYZ 
Correctional Health Services, Inc., will illustrate the majority view 
prior to Jones v. Bock.118 When Anderson sued Virginia prison 
officials for failure to provide adequate medical treatment for his 
broken arm, the United States Federal District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia dismissed his complaint for failure to state a 
claim because he failed to allege exhaustion in his complaint.119 On 
appeal, employing the principle of expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius,120 the court pointed out that the statute includes a list of 
                                                     
110. Id.  
111. Id.
112. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012) (listing three dismissals for a failure to 
state a claim as grounds for barring IFP Status). 
113. Steele, 355 F.3d at 1209 (declining to follow other circuits that hold a 
failure to exhaust as an affirmative defense).  
114. Id. (citing and explaining FED. R. CIV. P. 8). 
115. Id.  
116. Id. at 1210.  
117. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (listing three dismissals for a failure to 
state a claim as grounds for barring IFP Status). 
118. Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 675 (4th Cir. 
2005). 
119. Id. at 676. 
120. The Supreme Court has explained the meaning of this phrase. See 
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“Where Congress includes 
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the 
same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in 
the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”).  
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grounds for dismissals that should count as strikes—among the list, a 
failure to state a claim—but the list does not include a failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies as a reason for a strike-worthy 
dismissal.121 The court went on to explain that meanwhile, just a few 
lines below, the statute allows courts to dismiss prisoners’ claims if 
the prisoners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to 
bringing suit.122 The court argued that Congress must have 
intentionally omitted exhaustion from its list of strike-worthy 
dismissals because Congress provided exhaustion as grounds for a 
permissive dismissal just a few lines later.123 Identifying a clear 
distinction between a failure to exhaust and a failure to state a claim, 
the court held that a failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, 
rather than a pleading requirement.124
With circuits clearly divided, the Supreme Court decided to 
resolve the conflict.125 The Court granted certiorari to Lorenzo Jones, 
a prisoner appealing the Sixth Circuit’s decision that gave him a 
PLRA strike for failure to state a claim as a result of his failure to 
plead exhaustion.126 With the grant of certiorari, the Court set out to 
determine whether a prisoner’s failure to allege exhaustion should 
result in a strike-worthy dismissal for failure to state a claim, or an 
affirmative defense, which would not normally cause the prisoner to 
incur a PLRA strike.127
C. Jones v. Bock
In Jones v. Bock, the Supreme Court decisively rejected the 
minority opinion that exhaustion was a pleading requirement and 
sided with the majority of circuits in holding that a prisoner’s failure 
to exhaust should be viewed as an affirmative defense.128 In doing so, 
                                                     
121. Anderson, 407 F.3d at 680. 
122. Id.
123. Id.  
124. Id. at 681 (“[A]n inmate’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies 
must be viewed as an affirmative defense that should be pleaded or otherwise 
properly raised by the defendant.”).
125. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 205 (2007). 
126. Jones v. Bock, 135 F. App’x 837, 838-39 (6th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) 
(holding that a prisoner has to attach a copy of his prison grievance form to the 
complaint or explain how he exhausted administrative remedies in the complaint 
itself). 
127. See Bock, 549 U.S. at 205 (explaining the circuit split the Court 
intended to resolve). 
128. Id. at 216. 
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the Court provided a comprehensive discussion of the relationship 
between the PLRA and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,129 as
well as the relationship between various provisions within the PLRA 
itself.130 Finally, the Court provided dictum in hopes of clarifying that 
a failure to exhaust, viewed as an affirmative defense, should be 
treated the same way any other affirmative defense would be treated 
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.131
1. Jones v. Bock Holding 
The Court in Bock first discussed the significance of Rule 8 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.132 The Court explained that 
Rule 8(a) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim” in 
the complaint;133 meanwhile, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,134 the statute under 
which prisoners typically bring civil rights claims,135 makes no 
mention of the exhaustion of administrative remedies as an element 
needed for an actionable claim.136 Therefore, the Court reasoned, to 
provide a short and plain statement of a claim, a claimant usually 
does not have the burden of pleading exhaustion when bringing a 
lawsuit under § 1983.137 Rule 8(c), on the other hand, burdens 
defendants with claiming affirmative defenses in response to 
plaintiffs’ claims.138 The Court noted that the usual practice in other 
contexts is for a defendant to claim a plaintiff’s failure to exhaust as 
part of that defendant’s affirmative defense.139 Having determined 
that the usual practice was to view a failure to exhaust as an 
                                                     
129. See id. at 212-13 (discussing the PLRA’s effect—or lack thereof—on
the normal procedural rules). 
130. See id. (applying the principal of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to 
determine that Congress did not intend for the PLRA to create an added pleading 
requirement for prisoners). 
131. Id. at 214-15 (explaining that an affirmative defense appearing on the 
face of a complaint is grounds for a dismissal for failure to state a claim).  
132. Id. at 212 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8). 
133. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8). 
134. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
135. Bock, 549 U.S. at 212. 
136. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (making no mention of administrative remedies). 
137. Bock, 549 U.S. at 212 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8 and explaining its 
requirements). 
138. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (“In responding to a pleading, a party must 
affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense . . . .”).
139. Bock, 549 U.S. at 212 (explaining that exhaustion is treated as an 
affirmative defense “in the similar statutory scheme [that] govern[s] habeas 
corpus”).
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affirmative defense, the Court had to determine whether there was 
any reason to depart from the usual practice when handling 
prisoners’ civil rights claims.140
The Court discussed its previous case Leatherman v. Tarrant 
County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit to demonstrate 
that courts should not depart from the usual practice in response to 
apparent policy concerns.141 In Leatherman, the Fifth Circuit, through 
adjudication,142 had adopted a heightened pleading standard for 
claims concerning municipal liability.143 The Fifth Circuit created the 
rule because a claim against a municipality is meritless when the 
cause of action stems from an agent of the municipality acting 
outside the scope of her duty.144 A heightened pleading requirement 
could allow courts to dismiss such meritless claims145 by requiring a 
given plaintiff to allege that the defendant cannot successfully 
maintain an immunity defense.146 Such dismissals would protect 
municipalities from spending money litigating claims for which they 
are clearly not liable.147 Though the Supreme Court recognized the 
legitimate policy concerns addressed by the Fifth Circuit’s
heightened pleading requirement, the Court emphasized that Rule 8 
pleading is a liberal standard and ultimately held that such a 
requirement could only be imposed by an amendment to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, not by a federal district or circuit court.148
After the Bock Court discussed Leatherman as an example of a 
pleading requirement that was invalid for being inconsistent with the 
                                                     
140. See id. at 214 (explaining that nothing in the PLRA “justif[ies] 
deviating from the usual procedural practice”).
141. Id. at 212 (citing Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & 
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993)). 
142. Adjudicatory rulemaking is distinguished from the Court’s statutory 
rulemaking power. See discussion infra Section III.B.
143. See Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 165.  
144. Id. at 167 (explaining the Fifth Circuit’s heightened pleading standard). 
145. See id. A court could dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to 
state a claim if it did not meet the heightened standard. See also id. (explaining that 
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed a 
complaint because it did not meet the heightened pleading standard). 
146. Id. (citing Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1473 (5th Cir. 1985)). 
147. See id. at 166 (explaining respondents’ argument that a more relaxed 
pleading requirement subjects municipalities to expensive discovery when litigation 
is unnecessary).  
148. See id. at 168 (“Perhaps if Rules 8 and 9 were rewritten today, claims 
against municipalities under § 1983 might be subjected to the added specificity 
requirement of Rule 9(b). But that is a result which must be obtained by the process 
of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.”).
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usual pleading practice, the Court looked to the PLRA to determine 
whether it created any reason for a departure from the usual pleading 
practice.149
The Court determined that nothing in the PLRA “justif[ies] 
deviating from the usual procedural practice” for pleading.150 The 
Court first noted that Congress was silent on the issue of exhaustion 
and further explained that congressional silence regarding an added 
pleading requirement is strong evidence that Congress intended 
exhaustion to be viewed as an affirmative defense.151 Proponents for 
a pleading requirement argued that requiring prisoners to allege 
exhaustion would make it easier to identify meritless claims, but the 
Court rejected the argument, noting that the same could be said for 
any affirmative defense.152 The Court then noted that one of 
Congress’s primary focuses with the PLRA was the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies.153 With Congress honed in on exhaustion,
its choice not to include exhaustion among the listed grounds for a 
strike-worthy dismissal154 indicates that it did not intend prisoners to 
incur a PLRA strike for failing to plead exhaustion.155 After careful 
reasoning, the Court decisively held that a “failure to exhaust is an 
affirmative defense under the PLRA” and that prisoners should not 
be “required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their 
complaints.”156
2. Jones v. Bock Dictum 
A more detailed explanation of the procedural rules regarding 
Rule 8 and Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will 
provide a backdrop for a discussion of the Court’s dictum.157 While 
                                                     
149. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 214 (2007) (holding that the PLRA does 
not warrant a departure “from the usual procedural practice”).
150. Id. 
151. See id. at 212 (explaining that congressional silence on the issue of 
exhaustion is “strong evidence that the usual practice should be followed,” which “is
to regard exhaustion as an affirmative defense”).
152. Id. at 215. 
153. Id. at 215-16 (“The rejoinder that the PLRA focused on exhaustion 
rather than other defenses simply highlights the failure of Congress to include 
exhaustion in terms among the enumerated grounds justifying dismissal upon early 
screening.”).
154. Id. 
155. See id. at 216 (explaining that Congress did not intend exhaustion to be 
a pleading requirement). 
156. Id.  
157. See id. at 212-14. 
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an affirmative defense is normally brought with a defendant’s
responsive pleading,158 an affirmative defense can be grounds for a 
dismissal for failure to state a claim if the defense appears on the 
face of a complaint.159 For example, if it is clear by reading the 
complaint that the defendant is protected by governmental immunity, 
a protection normally pled as an affirmative defense, the court should 
dismiss the complaint for a failure to state a claim.160 However, 
affirmative defenses will rarely appear on the face of complaints to 
give courts grounds to dismiss for failure to state a claim.161
Acknowledging that an affirmative defense appearing on the 
face of a complaint can be grounds for a dismissal for failure to state 
a claim, the Court in Bock explained that its holding does not alter 
this procedural rule.162 If a prisoner’s failure to exhaust reveals itself 
on the face of a complaint, consistent with the treatment of any other 
affirmative defense, the complaint should be dismissed for a failure 
to state a claim.163 The Court warned, however, that this type of 
dismissal “is a bit of a red herring” because a complaint should only 
be dismissed for failure to state a claim if the information within the 
complaint itself—as opposed to information outside the complaint—
would not entitle the plaintiff to relief.164 The Court’s dictum
effectively clarified that the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies should be treated the same as any other 
affirmative defense.165
In sum, the Supreme Court ended a circuit split that existed 
until 2007 with its decision in Jones v. Bock.166 Originally, a minority 
                                                     
158. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
159. Bock, 549 U.S. at 215 (explaining that an affirmative defense on the 
face of a complaint is grounds for a dismissal for failure to state a claim). 
160. Rhynette Northcross Hurd, The Propriety of Permitting Affirmative 
Defenses to Be Raised by Motions to Dismiss, 20 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 411, 413 
(1990).  
161. Id. (“For a court to [grant] a 12(b)(6) dismissal on the basis of an 
affirmative defense, the defense must appear on the face of the complaint; therefore, 
many . . . affirmative defenses . . . are not likely to be successfully raised by motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” (footnote omitted)).
162. Bock, 549 U.S. at 215.  
163. Id. (explaining that a complaint can be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim when an affirmative defense—including a failure to exhaust—appears on the 
face of the complaint). 
164. Id. at 214-15. 
165. See id. (explaining that a failure to exhaust should be treated the same 
as any other affirmative defense). 
166. See id. at 205, 215 (describing the circuit split and subsequently ending 
it). 
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of the circuit courts was dismissing prisoners’ complaints for failure 
to state a claim—a strike-worthy dismissal under the PLRA167—if the 
complaints did not adequately allege exhaustion.168 However, the 
Supreme Court rejected the minority view that exhaustion was a 
pleading requirement by holding in Bock that a prisoner’s failure to 
exhaust should be claimed by defendants as an affirmative defense,169
which is not grounds for a PLRA strike.170 The Court went on to 
caution in dictum that an affirmative defense appearing on the face 
of a complaint is still grounds for that complaint’s dismissal for 
failure to state a claim, and the Court clarified that there is no 
exception to this rule if the affirmative defense is a failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.171 The Court’s decision in Bock seemed to 
eliminate the issue of prisoners pleading exhaustion; however, the 
Court’s dictum in Bock, in conjunction with district court rules—
specifically, rules requiring pro forma complaints prompting 
prisoners to discuss their exhaustion of administrative remedies—has 
created a mechanism by which prisoners are still incurring PLRA 
strikes for failing to allege the exhaustion of administrative remedies 
in their complaints.172
III. COURT RULES CAUSING PLRA STRIKES
Since Bock, some federal district court rules173 mandating pro 
forma complaints have been forcing prisoners to reveal the 
affirmative defense of failure to exhaust in their complaints.174 An 
                                                     
167. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (2012). 
168. See Bock, 549 U.S. at 205. 
169. Id. at 215. 
170. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (providing a list of strike-worthy dismissals 
that does not include losing a case due to a defendant’s affirmative defense). 
171. See Bock, 549 U.S. at 212 (explaining that affirmative defenses 
appearing on the face of a complaint are grounds for a failure to state a claim and 
that the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust is no exception to this rule).
172. See discussion infra Part III. 
173. See, e.g., D. ARIZ. LRCIV 3.4; M.D. FLA. R. 1.05(e); M.D. PA. LR 4.7. 
The local court rules themselves do not indicate an exhaustion requirement, but they 
require use of complaint forms that have portions requiring prisoners to discuss the 
exhaustion of administrative remedies. See infra note 175 (providing the standard 
form complaints corresponding to the court rules listed in note 173, each of which 
asks prisoners to discuss their exhaustion of administrative remedies, and also 
providing standard form complaints that do not ask prisoners to discuss exhaustion).  
174. See, e.g., Sanks v. Williams, No. CV407-070, 2007 WL 3254368, at *2-
4 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 2, 2007) (dismissing prisoner’s complaint for failure to state a 
claim because the affirmative defense for failure to exhaust administrative remedies 
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explanation of Dawn Ball’s litigation in the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania and in the Third Circuit will illustrate how local court 
rules that require certain pro forma complaints175 may cause a 
prisoner to incur a PLRA strike for a failure to state a claim.176 While 
courts have some discretion to create these rules, courts’ rulemaking 
power is subject to significant limitations.177
A. Dawn Ball’s PLRA Strike for Her Failure to Exhaust 
Administrative Remedies 
An explanation of the progression of prisoner Dawn Ball’s
litigation illustrates the problem with pro forma complaints that ask 
prisoners about their exhaustion of administrative remedies.178 Ball 
filed a civil rights action against State Correctional Institution Muncy 
                                                                                                               
appeared on the face of the complaint); Bilal v. Wise, No. 2:10–cv–638–FtM–
29SPC, 2010 WL 4668474, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2010) (same); Sorce v. 
Garikpaetiti, No. 14–CV–0327 BEN (JMA), 2014 WL 2506213, at *3 (S.D. Cal.
June 2, 2014) (same). 
175. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF ARIZ., INSTRUCTIONS FOR 
A PRISONER FILING A CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA (2013), http://www.prisonlaw.com/ 
pdfs/AZSection1983Form,2013.pdf (providing an example of a standard form 
complaint that asks prisoners to discuss their exhaustion of administrative remedies);
U.S. DIST. COURT MIDDLE DIST. OF FLA., INSTRUCTIONS FOR FILING A CIVIL RIGHTS 
COMPLAINT BY PRISONERS UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (n.d.), 
https://www.flmd.uscourts.gov/forms/Prisoner/PrisonerCivilRightsComplaint.pdf 
(same); U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DIST. OF PA., FORM TO BE USED BY A 
PRISONER IN FILING A CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT (n.d.), http://www.pamd.
uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/complain.pdf (same). Still, other federal district 
courts use forms that do not ask prisoners about their exhaustion of administrative 
remedies. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE W. DIST. OF MICH., FORM TO BE USED 
BY A PRISONER IN FILING A COMPLAINT UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 (n.d.), http://www.miwd.uscourts.gov/sites/miwd/files/cmpref.pdf 
(demonstrating a pro forma complaint that does not require prisoners to plead 
exhaustion); U.S. DIST. COURT DIST. OF MINN., PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT 
(n.d.), http://www.mnd.uscourts.gov/Pro-Se/ProSeForms/ProSe-Civil-Rights-
Complaint.pdf (same); U.S. DIST. COURT DIST. OF N.H., INSTRUCTIONS FOR FILING A 
COMPLAINT BY A PRISONER UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (n.d.),
http://www.nhd.uscourts.gov/pdf/Inmate%20Complaint%20USDCNH-11.pdf 
(same). 
176. See discussion infra Section III.A (providing an example of the 
mechanism by which prisoners are incurring PLRA strikes for their failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies). 
177. See discussion infra Sections III.B-C (discussing limitations to court 
rulemaking imposed by Rule 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and by The 
Rules Enabling Act). 
178. See supra notes 173-175. 
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(SCI Muncy) in the United States Federal District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania.179 Her complaint alleged that prison 
officials retaliated against her for reporting an incident of sexual 
assault.180 She alleged that, as part of the retaliation, prison officials 
denied her food, clothes, and basic hygiene products and that they 
placed her in a filthy cell that was covered in the feces and blood of 
prior occupants.181
Ball filed her complaint using a district-court-created pro forma 
complaint provided to her by prison officials.182 Like many other pro 
forma complaints for prisoners,183 this form required Ball to explain 
how she had exhausted administrative remedies.184 Providing boxes 
to check “yes” or “no,” the complaint asked her: (1) if her institution 
had a grievance procedure; (2) whether she had filed a grievance 
concerning the facts contained in the complaint; and (3) whether the 
grievance process was completed.185 “Ball checked ‘yes’ for the first 
two questions and ‘no’ for the third question,” thereby indicating that 
she had not exhausted all administrative remedies.186
The defendants attempted to have Ball’s claim dismissed for 
failure to state a claim because her pro forma complaint revealed that 
she failed to exhaust administrative remedies.187 Preparing to make a 
ruling on the defendants’ motion, the court cited the PLRA and 
various cases establishing that the exhaustion of administrative 
remedies is mandatory.188 Noting Ball’s failure to oppose the 
                                                     
179. Ball v. SCI Muncy, No. 1:08-CV-0391, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2008) 
(casetext), https://casetext.com/case/ball-v-sci-muncy-2.  
180. Id. at *2.  
181. Id.  
182. Ball v. SCI Muncy, 385 F. App’x. 211, 213 (3d Cir. 2010). 
183. See supra note 175 (providing an example of the pro forma complaint 
used in the Middle District of Pennsylvania and similar pro forma complaints used 
in other districts).
184. See Ball, 385 F. App’x. at 213 (“The questions are: (1) ‘Is there a 
grievance procedure available at your institution?;’ (2) ‘Have you filed a grievance 
concerning the facts relating to this complaint?;’ and (3) ‘Is the grievance process 
completed?’”).
185. Id. (explaining the contents of the pro forma complaint that Ball used). 
186. Id.  
187. Ball v. SCI Muncy, No. 1:08-CV-0391, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2008) 
(casetext), https://casetext.com/case/ball-v-sci-muncy-2.
188. Id. at *4 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006) (making exhaustion 
mandatory)); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002) (holding that prisoners 
must exhaust administrative remedies, regardless of the relief sought); Woodford v. 
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006) (holding that prisoners must exhaust administrative 
remedies and must do so properly). 
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defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6)189 motion that alleged Ball failed to 
exhaust her administrative remedies, the court dismissed her action, 
explaining that her claims were not properly before the court.190
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania’s decision to dismiss Ball’s action for failure to state a 
claim because her pro forma complaint revealed that she failed to 
exhaust administrative remedies.191 The court first established that 
Ball’s complaint indicated that she had not exhausted administrative 
remedies.192 The court then explained that it could only review 
matters within Ball’s original complaint, noting that Ball’s letters 
and additional complaints explaining her problems with prison 
officials were irrelevant to the court’s review.193 Finally, explaining 
that Ball’s complaint provided no excuse for failing to exhaust 
administrative remedies, the court affirmed the District Court, and 
Ball proceeded no further with the action.194
In a separate action that reached the Third Circuit, Ball again 
brought a § 1983 claim against SCI Muncy, now alleging that the 
prison was deliberately indifferent to her medical needs.195 The crux
of this case, however, was whether Ball had acquired three strikes 
under the PLRA, which would preclude her from claiming IFP 
Status.196 As part of its decision, the Third Circuit had to determine 
whether Ball’s previously dismissed complaint alleging sexual 
assault197 should count as a strike against her pursuant to the 
PLRA.198 The court acknowledged that Ball’s complaint was 
dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies199—a failure 
                                                     
189. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (allowing for complaints to be dismissed when 
they “fail[] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”).
190. SCI Muncy, No. 1:08-CV-0391, at *5.  
191. Ball, 385 F. App’x. at 212 (“The District Court granted the Defendants’
motions to dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), on the 
grounds of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We agree with the District 
Court’s decision and accordingly affirm the dismissal of Ball’s claims.”).
192. See id. at 213 (“First, the material she cites in her Complaint, which she 
claims contradicts the check mark stating that she completed the grievance process, 
does not present a conflict or even any ambiguity.”).
193. Id. at 214. 
194. Id. at 212. 
195. Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 451 (3d Cir. 2013) (discussing the case 
from the district court now on appeal).  
196. Id.  
197. Ball v. SCI Muncy, No. 1:08-CV-0391, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2008) 
(casetext), https://casetext.com/case/ball-v-sci-muncy-2.
198. Famiglio, 726 F.3d at 466 (discussing Ball’s potential strikes). 
199. Id.  
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that would not provide an independent ground for a failure to state a
claim or a PLRA strike.200 However, because her pro forma 
complaint included her checkmark indicating that she had not 
exhausted all administrative remedies,201 the court determined that 
her complaint revealed the affirmative defense for failure to exhaust 
on its face.202 The court held that a finding of the affirmative defense 
of failure to exhaust on the face of her complaint in conjunction with 
the District Court’s explicit dismissal in response to the defendant’s
Rule 12(b)(6) motion caused Ball to accrue a PLRA strike.203
The Middle District of Pennsylvania’s court rule204 mandating 
the pro forma complaint205 that resulted in Dawn Ball’s PLRA strike 
is not an uncommon court rule.206 Many federal district courts 
similarly have local rules mandating pro forma complaints that 
require prisoners to discuss their exhaustion of administrative 
remedies.207 While federal district courts have some discretion to 
create such local rules as extensions of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, their power to create these rules is subject to various 
limitations.208
B. The Rules Enabling Act and District Court Rulemaking 
Congress established court rulemaking with its passage of the 
Rules Enabling Act (REA) in 1934.209 The REA created a centralized 
rulemaking process by delegating to the Supreme Court the power to 
                                                     
200. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012) (providing a list of strike-worthy 
dismissals that does not include failure to exhaust). 
201. See Ball v. SCI Muncy, 385 F. App’x. 211, 213 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(describing the form complaint). 
202. Famiglio, 726 F.3d at 466 (holding that Ball’s dismissal in SCI Muncy
counted as a PLRA strike). 
203. Id.
204. M.D. PA. LR 4.7. 
205. U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DIST. OF PA., FORM TO BE USED BY A 
PRISONER IN FILING A CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT (n.d.), http://www.pamd.uscourts. 
gov/sites/default/files/complain.pdf. 
206. See supra note 173 (providing examples of court rules requiring forms 
that ask prisoners about exhaustion).
207. See supra note 175. 
208. See discussion infra Section III.B. 
209. See Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended 
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (2012)); Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making 
Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 
GEO. L.J. 887, 888 (1999) (discussing the REA and court rulemaking). 
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create and modify the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.210 The 
process allows for proposed changes to the rules to go through a 
sequence of committee review and public comment, followed by a 
submission to the Supreme Court for a final review before the rules 
are ultimately transmitted to Congress.211 Once transmitted, if 
Congress does not affirmatively act to modify or reject the rules 
within seven months, they take effect as part of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.212
Apart from making the Federal Rules,213 the Court also has the 
power to determine “the application of the Rules by adjudicating 
cases and controversies . . . implicat[ing] civil procedure.”214 For 
example, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,215 the Court abandoned 
its well-established pleading standard that allowed a plaintiff to 
satisfy Rule 8(a) with mere legal conclusions, and it created a new 
and more demanding pleading requirement by interpreting Rule 8(a) 
to require a plaintiff to plead facts sufficient to make a claim for 
relief “plausible.”216 With this decision, the Court explicitly 
heightened the standard for Rule 8 pleading in hopes of mitigating 
the high costs of discovery and reducing unmeritorious cases,217 and 
all federal courts are now bound by the Court’s interpretation of 
Rule 8(a).218
1. Delegation of Rulemaking Power to District Courts 
Employing its rulemaking power, the Supreme Court created 
Rule 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to allow federal 
district courts to make local court rules.219 Rule 83 allows for district 
                                                     
210. Bone, supra note 209, at 888-89. 
211. Id.  
212. Id. at 892. 
213. The term “Federal Rules” is interchangeable with “Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure” throughout this Note. 
214. Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s 
Regulation of Civil Procedure: Lessons from Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV.
1188, 1194 (2012).  
215. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).  
216. Id. at 556.
217. See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 214, at 1196 (explaining the 
impact of the Court’s decision in Twombly).
218. See id. at 1196-97. This concept applies throughout the United States 
court system, as all lower courts within a given jurisdiction must follow superior 
courts. Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Structure and Precedent, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1460-
61 (2010). 
219. FED. R. CIV. P. 83. 
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courts to create local rules with a majority vote of district judges 
after a public notice and comment period.220 However, the local rules 
are limited in that they “must be consistent with—but not 
duplicate—federal statutes and rules adopted” by the Supreme Court 
pursuant to the REA.221 Consequently, local rules are invalid under 
Rule 83 if they are inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure as interpreted by the Court.222 While local rules are subject 
to the limitations imposed by the Supreme Court through Rule 83, all 
court rulemaking is further constrained by the REA.223
2. Further Rulemaking Limitations 
All federal court rules, whether created locally or by the 
Supreme Court, are subject to certain limits imposed by Congress.224
The REA’s § 2071 stipulates that district courts may create 
procedural rules, but it states that those rules must be consistent with 
the Supreme Court’s rules created pursuant to § 2072.225 Meanwhile, 
§ 2072 dictates that rules created by the Supreme Court “shall not 
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”226 Therefore, it 
follows that district court rules—to be consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s rules—must “not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right.”227 This limitation leaves courts with the power to create local 
rules that affect procedural rights, but not substantive rights.228
Unfortunately, distinguishing between procedural rights and 
substantive rights is controversial.229 Scholars have long discussed 
                                                     
220. Id.  
221. Id.
222. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 150-51 (1973) (examining a local 
court rule for its validity under Rule 83, but ultimately upholding the local rule, 
holding that it was consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
223. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2072 (2012). 
224. See Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking “Substantive Rights” (in the Rules 
Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 93-95 (1998) 
(describing the theoretical limits of federal court rulemaking). 
225. 28 U.S.C. § 2071. 
226. Id. § 2072. 
227. Id. §§ 2071-2072. 
228. See Kelleher, supra note 224, at 101-05 (discussing congressional intent 
for the REA). 
229. See Martin H. Redish & Dennis Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act and 
the Procedural–Substantive Tension: A Lesson in Statutory Interpretation, 93 MINN.
L. REV. 26, 26-27 (2008) (“To this day, no real consensus has developed as to how 
the [REA] should be interpreted.”). 
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Congress’s impetus for the REA while attempting to define the 
difference between procedural and substantive rulemaking.230
C. The Substantive Rulemaking Limitation 
One of Congress’s primary concerns with its passage of the 
REA was that it provided a limitation to the degree of power 
delegated to the Court for its rulemaking.231 Congress derives its 
authority to regulate practice and procedure in federal courts from 
Articles I and III of the Constitution,232 which give Congress the 
power to create lower federal courts, along with the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, which gives Congress the authority to make laws 
“necessary and proper” for the implementation of that power.233
When Congress delegated rulemaking power to the Court with the 
REA, it prohibited the Court from making rules regarding 
substantive rights to ensure that the REA reserved for Congress any 
federal lawmaking that involved policy decisions or required choices 
among competing interests.234
In the early days of the REA, the Court largely ignored the 
rulemaking limitations Congress attempted to impose.235 In Sibbach 
v. Wilson & Co.,236 the Court held that the test for determining the 
validity of a rule created under the REA was “whether a rule really 
regulates procedure.”237 In other words, if a rule fell somewhere in 
the uncertain area between procedural and substantive, it would be 
upheld so long as it regulated procedure in some way.238 In its 1987 
decision of Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods,239 the Court 
held that an “incidental” impact on substantive rights was 
permissible so long as it was necessary to preserve the integrity of a 
                                                     
230. See Kelleher, supra note 224, at 101-05 (discussing controversy over 
the REA); Redish & Murashko, supra note 229, at 27-30 (discussing confusion 
regarding the REA).
231. See Kelleher, supra note 224, at 93. 
232. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art. III; see also Kelleher, supra note 224, at 
62 (explaining constitutional delegation of power). 
233. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8. 
234. See Kelleher, supra note 224, at 93.  
235. See id. at 95-96. 
236. 312 U.S. 1 (1941). 
237. Id. at 14. 
238. Kelleher, supra note 224, at 96-97 (discussing the Court’s holding in 
Sibbach). 
239. 480 U.S. 1 (1987).
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uniform system of rules governing federal practice and procedure.240
As the Court recognized virtually no limit to its rulemaking power, 
Congress sought to redefine the meaning of the REA.241  
Congress attempted to rectify the Court’s failure to recognize 
any rulemaking limitations by amending the REA in 1988.242 While 
the 1988 amendment did not change the language of the REA, 
Congress attempted to change the law’s meaning by adding 
legislative history.243 An added House Judiciary Committee note 
explained that the Court had overstepped its bounds and that the 
Committee felt it needed to carefully state its views on the scope of 
Congress’s delegation of rulemaking power.244 Firstly, the 
Committee emphasized that Congress had delegated only a portion 
of its power with the REA and that the substantive rights limitation 
prohibits the Court from creating rules regarding matters already 
addressed by acts of Congress or that may be addressed by Congress 
in the future.245 The Committee went on to explain that the 
substantive rights limitation goes beyond protecting rights conferred 
by law; rather, the protection, “[a]t the least . . . prevents . . . rules, 
otherwise valid,” from being applied when they would have the 
effect of altering rights conferred by substantive law.246 Put 
differently, the Committee explained that court rules violate the REA 
when they are created with the intent to regulate procedure but have 
an incidental effect on substantive rights.247 Finally, the Committee 
emphasized that only Congress, not the Supreme Court, has the 
authority to make choices involving policy considerations outside the 
business of the courts.248
After the 1988 amendment, the Court started constraining its 
rulemaking power.249 Two years after the amendment, in Cooter & 
Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., the Court affirmatively recognized that it 
has no authority to enact rules affecting substantive rights.250 In 
Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, 
                                                     
240. Id. at 5. 
241. See Kelleher, supra note 224, at 101-03 (discussing Congress’s reason 
for amending the REA). 
242. Id.
243. Id. at 101-02. 
244. Id. at 102. 
245. H.R. REP. NO. 99-422, at 20-21 (1985). 
246. Id. at 21-22.
247. Kelleher, supra note 224, at 102-03.
248. H.R. REP. NO. 99-422, at 21. 
249. Kelleher, supra note 224, at 105-06.
250. 496 U.S. 384, 391 (1990). 
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Inc., Justice Kennedy emphasized in his dissent that the Court 
needed to further constrain its rulemaking power.251 Finally, in the 
2010 case of Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate 
Insurance Co., the Court attempted to provide a more explicit rule 
regarding the substantive rights limitation.252
In Shady Grove, the Court attempted to clarify the distinction 
between procedural and substantive rules while determining whether 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was valid under the 
REA.253 Rule 23 allows for multiple plaintiffs to join their claims in a 
class action against a single defendant.254 Allstate argued that Rule 23 
affected its substantive rights by garnering more plaintiffs making 
claims against it because plaintiffs were more likely to join a class 
action than they were to bring lawsuits against the company 
individually.255 In determining whether Rule 23 impermissibly 
affected substantive rights, the Court enigmatically explained that a 
rule is unlawfully substantive “if it alters ‘the rules of decision by 
which [the] court will adjudicate . . . rights.’”256 Applying its rule, the 
Court upheld Rule 23, reasoning that it merely changes how the 
claims are processed, not the ultimate outcome of the case.257 The 
Court explained that Rule 23 does not add or subtract from 
individual plaintiffs’ claims to relief and that it does not affect 
defendants’ rights because defendants maintain all of the same 
defenses.258 While the Court’s reasoning provided some useable 
framework, there is still no clear definition of the substantive rights 
limitation.259
While distinguishing between procedural and substantive rules 
is still a topic of great debate,260 Congress and the Court have 
                                                     
251. 498 U.S. 533, 554 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
252. See 559 U.S. 393, 406-07 (2010) (setting forth a new test for 
determining whether a court rule regulates substance or procedure).  
253. Id.  
254. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.  
255. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 408.  
256. Id. at 407 (first alteration in original). 
257. See id. at 407-08 (holding that Rule 23 “undeniably regulated only the 
process for enforcing . . . rights”). 
258. See id. (“[N]one altered the rights themselves, the available remedies, or 
the rules of decision by which the court adjudicated either.”).
259. See Richard D. Freer, The Continuing Gloom About Federal Judicial 
Rulemaking, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 447, 453-54 (2013) (discussing the ongoing 
confusion about the substantive rights limitation). 
260. See id.  
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established some general principles that provide some guidance.261
First, attempting to rectify the Court’s liberal application of the REA, 
Congress’s 1988 amendment established that the Court is prohibited 
from making rules that conflict with a current federal law or that are 
likely to conflict with a law Congress may pass in the future.262
Congress also explained that it intended for the Court to be 
prohibited not only from creating rules for the purpose of affecting 
substantive rights, but also rules that have an effect on substantive 
rights.263 Finally, in Shady Grove, the Court provided that court rules 
are invalid if they affect how a court will decide an issue264 and that 
procedural rules should only affect how courts process claims.265
While distinguishing between procedural and substantive rights can 
be difficult, these general rules provide a framework for making that 
important determination.266
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, along with local court 
rules—such as the court rules requiring pro forma complaints that 
ask prisoners about their exhaustion of administrative remedies267—
are an integral part of the federal court system.268 Despite the 
prominence of court rulemaking, courts are subject to significant 
limitations to their rulemaking power.269 Namely, all local rules must 
be consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,270 and all 
court rules must respect the substantive rights limitation imposed by 
the REA.271 Therefore, any court rule falling outside the scope of 
these limitations is invalid and should be eliminated.272
                                                     
261. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 408 (discussing limitations imposed by 
the REA); H.R. REP. NO. 99-422, at 21 (1985) (same).
262. See Kelleher, supra note 224, at 103. 
263. Id.
264. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 406-08 (discussing limitations imposed 
by the REA). 
265. See id. at 407-08. 
266. See id. at 408 (discussing limitations imposed by the REA); H.R. REP.
NO. 99-422, at 21 (1985) (same). 
267. See supra notes 192, 194 and accompanying text. 
268. See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 214, at 1194-202 (describing 
how the Court makes the Federal Rules). 
269. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012); FED. R. CIV. P. 83. 
270. FED. R. CIV. P. 83. 
271. 28 U.S.C. § 2072. 
272. Id. §§ 2071-2072. 
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IV. ELIMINATING THE PRO FORMA COMPLAINTS
In Jones v. Bock, the Court unequivocally sided with the 
majority of circuit courts, holding that a prisoner’s failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, not a pleading 
requirement.273 However, many federal district courts now use pro 
forma complaint forms that require prisoners to include information 
about their exhaustion of administrative remedies in their 
complaints,274 and forms that ask for this information can ultimately 
lead to prisoners incurring PLRA strikes and being disqualified from 
using IFP Status to access the courts.275 The portions of the court 
forms requiring prisoners to discuss the exhaustion of administrative 
remedies in their complaints need to be eliminated to prevent 
prisoners from being unfairly denied access to the courts.276 Because 
questions about exhaustion within the pro forma complaints are 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Rule 8 and 
unlawfully abridge prisoners’ substantive rights to access the courts, 
a public-interest group should litigate on behalf of a prisoner who is 
being forced to use a pro forma complaint that includes portions that 
ask about exhaustion and seek to eliminate those portions of the 
form.  
A. Pro Forma Complaints Directly Cause PLRA Strikes 
Many federal district courts have court rules277 requiring pro 
forma complaints that force prisoners to provide information about 
                                                     
273. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007) (“We conclude that [a] failure 
to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, and that inmates are not 
required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.”).
274. See supra note 175 (providing some examples of pro forma complaints 
that require prisoners to allege exhaustion and other pro forma complaints that do 
not require prisoners to allege exhaustion). 
275. See supra note 174 (providing examples of cases involving prisoners 
who incurred PLRA strikes as a result of their pro forma complaints revealing the 
affirmative defense of failure to exhaust). 
276. See, e.g., Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 470-71 (3d Cir. 2013) (barring 
a prisoner from IFP Status after she had a complaint dismissed for failure to state a 
claim as the result of a pro forma complaint revealing her failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies). 
277. See supra note 173 (providing examples of court rules that require the 
pro forma complaints, but also noting that the requirement that prisoners allege 
exhaustion arises from the court rules in conjunction with the pro forma complaints 
themselves). 
Eliminating Standard Pleading Forms 1211 
their exhaustion of administrative remedies.278 Despite most prisoners 
bringing complaints under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which does not require 
any information about the exhaustion of administrative remedies,279
certain pro forma complaints force prisoners to divulge whether they 
have exhausted all of their administrative remedies.280 Using one of 
these forms, a prisoner failing to exhaust administrative remedies 
effectively includes an affirmative defense—failure to exhaust—on 
the face of his complaint.281 While prisoners are required to exhaust 
administrative remedies, Congress did not intend for a prisoner to 
incur a PLRA strike for failing to exhaust.282 However, the 
revelations prompted by the forms’ added pleading requirements—
namely, affirmative defenses showing up on the face of the 
complaints—cause prisoners to have their complaints dismissed for 
failure to state a claim, which is grounds for a PLRA strike.283
Because such dismissals count as PLRA strikes against prisoners, the 
pro forma complaints with questions about exhaustion may 
ultimately cause PLRA strikes, which, in conjunction with two other 
strikes, will disqualify prisoners from claiming IFP Status to access 
the courts.284
B. Eliminating the Problem Through Litigation  
An effective means to eliminate questions about exhaustion 
from the pro forma complaints is through the courts. To best 
illustrate the problem prisoners currently face as a result of the 
exhaustion questions found within the pro forma complaints and to 
explain how to eliminate these questions, a discussion using a 
hypothetical court (Court X) and hypothetical prisoner (Prison Mike) 
                                                     
278. See supra notes 173-175 (showing examples of the court rules, the 
corresponding forms, and the results for prisoners).
279. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (making no mention of the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies). 
280. See supra notes 173-175 (showing examples of the court rules, the 
corresponding forms, and the results for prisoners). 
281. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 214-15 (2007) (explaining that an 
affirmative defense revealing itself on the face of a complaint is grounds for a failure 
to state a claim). 
282. Id. at 216 (“It is to say that there is no basis for concluding that 
Congress implicitly meant to transform exhaustion from an affirmative defense to a 
pleading requirement by the curiously indirect route of specifying that courts should 
screen PLRA complaints and dismiss those that fail to state a claim.”).
283. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012) (providing types of dismissals that can bar a 
prisoner from IFP Status). 
284. Id.
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is necessary. This hypothetical will be carried throughout the 
analysis to illustrate the solution that could be employed to eliminate 
exhaustion questions from pro forma complaints in any jurisdiction 
where the complaints exist.285 Within the jurisdiction of Court X, 
which uses pro forma complaints that require prisoners to reveal 
information about their exhaustion of administrative remedies, a
public-interest group should seek to represent Prison Mike. Prison 
Mike has grounds for a civil rights lawsuit, has been unable to 
exhaust administrative remedies, and has two other PLRA strikes.286
Because requiring prisoners to answer questions about exhaustion in 
their pro forma complaints is inconsistent with Rule 8 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure as interpreted by the Court in Jones v. 
Bock287 and unlawfully abridges prisoners’ substantive rights288 to 
access the courts,289 a public-interest group should seek to eliminate 
the portions of the pro forma complaints that force prisoners to 
discuss their exhaustion of administrative remedies.  
1. Court X’s Pro Forma Complaints Violate Rule 83 of the 
Federal Rules 
Court X presumably used its power under Rule 83 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to create its local rule that requires 
Prison Mike to use one of its pro forma complaints that ask prisoners 
about their exhaustion of administrative remedies.290 Rule 83 requires 
local rules to “be consistent with” federal law and rules adopted by 
the Supreme Court.291 Therefore, local rules inconsistent with federal 
law or with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are invalid.292 In 
                                                     
285. See supra note 173 (providing examples of jurisdictions where such an 
action would be effective). 
286. The hypothetical prisoner has two PLRA strikes from having claims
dismissed because they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g). 
287. See Bock, 549 U.S. at 214-16 (explaining that requiring prisoners to 
plead their exhaustion of administrative remedies is inconsistent with Rule 8 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
288. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012) (precluding courts from making rules that 
affect substantive rights). 
289. Prison Mike’s access to the courts would be blocked because he would 
be barred from claiming IFP Status. Id. § 1915(g).
290. FED. R. CIV. P. 83 (allowing federal district courts to make local rules). 
291. Id.
292. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 163-64 (1973) (scrutinizing a 
local court rule for a possible inconsistency with the Federal Rules, but ultimately 
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Jones v. Bock, the Court held that requiring prisoners to plead 
exhaustion is inconsistent with Rule 8.293 Meanwhile, the exhaustion 
questions in Court X’s pro forma complaint will require Prison Mike 
to allege exhaustion in his complaint.294 Because Court X’s
requirement of the pro forma complaint is inconsistent with Rule 8 as 
interpreted by the Bock Court,295 it is invalid under Rule 83.296
In Bock, the Court clarified that the PLRA does not provide any 
reason for deviating from the usual procedural practice regarding 
Rule 8 pleading.297 The Court interpreted Rule 8, clarifying that the 
usual procedural practice is for plaintiffs to provide only a “short and 
plain statement of the claim” and for a failure to exhaust to be treated 
as an affirmative defense.298 Thereafter, the Court held that the PLRA 
does not implicitly or explicitly allow any court to demand a 
pleading requirement beyond what Rule 8 already requires—a short 
and plain statement of the claim.299 Further, by establishing that a 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, 
the Court’s holding clarified that the burden of pleading exhaustion 
is on defendants, rather than prisoners.300
                                                                                                               
upholding the validity of the rule after a determination that the rule was consistent 
with the Federal Rules). 
293. 549 U.S. 199, 215-16 (2007) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8). 
294. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF ARIZ., INSTRUCTIONS FOR 
A PRISONER FILING A CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA (2013), http://www.prisonlaw.com/ 
pdfs/AZSection1983Form,2013.pdf (providing examples of standard form 
complaints that ask prisoners to discuss their exhaustion of administrative remedies);
U.S. DIST. COURT MIDDLE DIST. OF FLA., INSTRUCTIONS FOR FILING A CIVIL RIGHTS 
COMPLAINT BY PRISONERS UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (n.d.),
https://www.flmd.uscourts.gov/forms/Prisoner/ PrisonerCivilRightsComplaint.pdf 
(same); U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DIST. OF PA., FORM TO BE USED BY A 
PRISONER IN FILING A CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT (n.d.), http://www.pamd.uscourts. 
gov/sites/default/files/complain.pdf (same).
295. Bock, 549 U.S. at 216 (holding that prisoners should not be made to 
demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints). 
296. See FED R. CIV. P. 83; Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 150-51 (upholding a local 
court rule only because it was consistent with the Federal Rules). 
297. See Bock, 549 U.S. at 212-14 (explaining that courts’ perceived policy 
concerns do not warrant a departure from the usual procedural practice).  
298. See id. at 212 (quoting and citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8). 
299. See id. at 214 (“We think that the PLRA’s screening requirement does 
not—explicitly or implicitly—justify deviating from the usual procedural 
practice . . . .”).
300. See id. at 208, 216 (reversing the district court judge’s holding that a 
prisoner had the burden to plead exhaustion). 
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Inconsistent with the Court’s interpretation of Rule 8 in Bock,301
Court X’s local rule deviates from the usual procedural practice by 
forcing prisoners to plead exhaustion.302 Court X’s rule strays from 
the usual practice because in addition to requiring Prison Mike’s
pleading to include a short and plain statement of the claim, Court 
X’s pro forma complaint requires him to reveal in his complaint the 
affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.303
Such a requirement is contrary to the usual procedural practice 
mandated by the Bock Court304 under Rule 8, which requires 
plaintiffs only to plead a short and plain statement of their claims and 
which places the burden of bringing an affirmative defense on 
defendants.305 Effectively, Court X’s rule removes the Defendant’s
burden to argue Prison Mike’s failure to exhaust as an affirmative 
defense,306 and it places the burden to plead exhaustion back on 
Prison Mike.307 The inclusion of exhaustion questions in Court X’s
pro forma complaint, therefore, directly contradicts the pleading-
burden distribution described by the Court in Bock, which placed the 
burden to plead exhaustion on defendants.308
In holding that prisoners should not be burdened with an added 
pleading requirement, the Bock Court also discussed its previous 
holding in Leatherman where it established that federal courts should 
not deviate from Rule 8 for perceived policy reasons.309 In that case, 
the Fifth Circuit imposed a heightened pleading requirement for 
claimants suing municipalities for what the court perceived to be a 
                                                     
301. See id. at 216 (holding that Rule 8 and the PLRA do not require 
prisoners to plead exhaustion and that prisoners should not have to demonstrate 
exhaustion in their complaints).
302. See supra notes 173, 294 (providing examples of the court rules and the 
corresponding pro forma complaints). 
303. See supra note 294 (providing examples of court forms that have 
sections forcing prisoners to discuss their exhaustion of administrative remedies). 
304. See Bock, 549 U.S. at 212-16 (explaining the usual procedural practice 
for pleading and going on to explain that the PLRA warrants no departure from that 
practice). 
305. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
306. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (requiring defendants to plead affirmative defenses). 
307. Courts require prisoners to fill out the pro forma complaints in their 
entirety. See supra note 294 (providing examples of the pro forma complaints that,
themselves, explain to prisoners that they must fill out the forms completely).
308. See Bock, 549 U.S. at 216 (holding that a prisoner’s failure to exhaust is 
an affirmative defense). 
309. Id. at 212. 
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legitimate policy concern.310 Primarily, the court was attempting to 
filter out the meritless cases where municipalities clearly had no 
liability by requiring plaintiffs who were suing municipalities to 
allege reasons that the municipalities could not maintain the defense 
of immunity.311 The Supreme Court, however, rejected the Fifth 
Circuit’s heightened pleading standard, emphasizing that Rule 8 is a 
liberal pleading standard and explaining that pleading requirements 
can only be altered by means of amending the Federal Rules.312
Similar to the Fifth Circuit’s heightened pleading requirement 
that was rejected by the Court in Leatherman,313 the inclusion of 
exhaustion questions in Court X’s pro forma complaint creates a 
heightened pleading requirement and therefore goes unlawfully 
beyond what is required by Rule 8.314 Presumably, Court X includes 
questions about exhaustion in its pro forma complaint to expedite its 
process of determining whether a prisoner has exhausted 
administrative remedies so that it can avoid adjudicating meritless 
matters.315 Similarly, in Leatherman, the Fifth Circuit was imposing a 
heightened pleading standard to avoid adjudicating meritless 
claims.316 The Supreme Court recognized the logic behind the policy 
in Leatherman, but nonetheless held that deviating from the pleading 
standard mandated by Rule 8 was unlawful without an amendment to 
the Federal Rules.317 Similarly, the added pleading requirement found 
in Court X’s pro forma complaints—practical, though, it may be—is 
inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure per Bock318
and, therefore, unlawful under Rule 83.319
                                                     
310. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 
507 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1993) (explaining the pleading standard that was imposed by 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals). 
311. See id. at 167. 
312. Id. at 168 (“We think that it is impossible to square the ‘heightened 
pleading standard’ applied by the Fifth Circuit in this case with the liberal system of 
‘notice pleading’ set up by the Federal Rules. Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint 
include only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim . . . .’”).
313. See id.  
314. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring “a short and plain statement of the 
claim”).
315. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212-14 (2007) (describing perceived 
policy concerns as courts’ impetus for heightened pleading requirements).
316. See Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 167-68 (finding the heightened pleading 
standard unlawful). 
317. See id. at 168-69. 
318. Bock, 549 U.S. at 216 (holding that prisoners should not be made to 
demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints). 
319. FED. R. CIV. P. 83.  
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A supporter of the inclusions of exhaustion questions in Court 
X’s pro forma complaints may argue that Court X’s requirement is 
distinguished from the heightened pleading requirement found in 
Leatherman.320 In Leatherman, the Fifth Circuit created the 
heightened pleading requirement by demanding the heightened 
pleading while adjudicating cases.321 Contrarily, Court X’s added 
pleading requirement is mandated by a local court rule that was 
created through notice and comment rulemaking.322 Therefore, unlike 
the Fifth Circuit in Leatherman—which was dismissing claims that 
did not meet its judicially imposed heightened pleading standards—
Court X’s rule was created through notice and comment 
rulemaking323 and simply obligates prisoners to discuss exhaustion in 
their complaints before the court even applies Rule 8.324 Therefore, 
Court X is not improperly applying Rule 8 in the courtroom the way 
the Fifth Circuit was improperly applying it in Leatherman.325
Distinguishing Leatherman in this manner, however, is 
problematic because it accounts for an irrelevant distinction between 
the means by which courts promulgate rules.326 The Supreme Court 
has the power to create and modify the Federal Rules through 
processes contemplated by the REA,327 but it can also modify and 
specify the application of the Federal Rules through its adjudicative 
function.328 For all practical purposes, all federal courts are bound by 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, regardless of whether the Court 
mandates them by statute or through adjudication.329 Similarly, 
federal district courts are able to create procedural rules through 
notice and comment rulemaking,330 but can also modify and specify 
the application of those rules through the courts’ adjudicative 
                                                     
320. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 167 (describing a heightened pleading standard 
created through adjudication). 
321. Id. 
322. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
323. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2072 (2012) (allowing for district courts to make 
rules through notice and comment rulemaking); FED. R. CIV. P. 83 (same). 
324. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
325. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 167-69 (holding that the Fifth Circuit’s 
heightened pleading requirement was unlawful). 
326. See supra Section III.B (discussing court rulemaking). 
327. See supra Section III.B.
328. See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 214, at 1194 (describing court 
rulemaking through adjudication). 
329. See id. at 1194-95. 
330. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2072 (2012) (allowing for district courts to make 
rules through notice and comment rulemaking); FED. R. CIV. P. 83 (same). 
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function.331 And similar to the Supreme Court’s rulemaking, for all 
practical purposes, court rules created by notice and comment 
rulemaking and court rules created through adjudication are equally 
binding.332 Statutory and adjudicative rules equally govern litigants; 
therefore, either type of court rule may be rendered invalid for its 
inconsistency with the Federal Rules.333 To illustrate, after having its 
heightened pleading requirement stricken by the Court in 
Leatherman,334 the Fifth Circuit likely would not have been permitted 
to use notice and comment rulemaking335 to circumvent the Court’s
holding by passing a court rule requiring plaintiffs to attach forms 
that imposed the same heightened pleading requirement that was 
stricken by the Court.336 If such were the case, lower courts could 
avoid following Supreme Court precedent by simply codifying 
heightened standards337 rather than requiring them through 
adjudication. Consequently, because the Court in Bock held that 
prisoners should not be required to demonstrate exhaustion as part of 
their complaints,338 Court X is not permitted to circumvent that 
holding by requiring prisoners to use pleading forms that force them 
to plead exhaustion.339
Finally, Court X’s requirement that prisoners discuss 
exhaustion in their pleadings is inconsistent with what the Bock
Court held that Congress intended for the PLRA.340 In Bock, the 
Court explained that nothing in the PLRA indicates congressional 
                                                     
331. See Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination 
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 167-69 (1993) (striking the Fifth Circuit’s court rule that was 
created through its adjudication). 
332. See FED. R. CIV. P. 83 (providing that courts can make local rules that 
must be followed); Dobbins, supra note 218, at 1460-61 (describing the precedential 
effects of a superior court within a given jurisdiction). 
333. See Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168 (finding a court rule created through 
adjudication to be inconsistent with the Federal Rules); see also Colgrove v. Battin, 
413 U.S. 149, 150-51 (1973) (examining a local court rule for its validity under Rule 
83, but ultimately upholding the local rule, holding that it was consistent with the 
Federal Rules). 
334. See Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 167-69.  
335. See FED. R. CIV. P. 83. 
336. See id. 
337. See id.
338. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). 
339. See supra notes 173, 175 (giving examples of the court rules and their 
corresponding pro forma complaints that require prisoners to discuss their 
exhaustion of administrative remedies). 
340. See Bock, 549 U.S. at 212-16 (holding that Congress did not intend for 
the PLRA to change Rule 8’s application to prisoners).
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intent to change the pleading requirements for prisoners.341 Rather, 
the Court explained, it appears that Congress intended for a failure to 
exhaust to be treated as an affirmative defense and for prisoners not 
to be burdened with any added pleading requirement.342 Therefore, it 
follows that Congress did not intend for prisoners to suffer the 
possibility of incurring a strike for failing to exhaust their 
administrative remedies.343 Contrary to congressional intent as 
described by the Court in Bock,344 exhaustion questions in Court X’s
pro forma complaints create an added pleading requirement for 
Prison Mike, remove the defendant’s burden of claiming an 
affirmative defense, and create the likely possibility that Prison Mike 
will incur a PLRA strike for failing to state a claim because the 
affirmative defense of failure to exhaust will appear on the face of 
his complaint.345 Because Court X’s mandate of exhaustion questions 
in the pro forma complaint is not “consistent with” Rule 8’s
application to prisoner–litigants as described by the Court in Bock,346
the rule is invalid under Rule 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.347
Court X’s rule requiring the pro forma complaints that ask 
about exhaustion is inconsistent with Rule 8 as interpreted by the 
Court in Bock and should therefore be eliminated.348 The Court 
clarified in Bock that the PLRA warrants no deviation from Rule 8’s
pleading requirement, regardless of perceived policy concerns.349
Meanwhile, presumably in an attempt to reduce the amount of cases 
it has to adjudicate, Court X has impermissibly created a heightened 
                                                     
341. See id.  
342. Id. at 214-15. 
343. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012) (providing a list of dismissals that 
would result in a PLRA strike). 
344. See Bock, 549 U.S. at 212-16. 
345. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (providing a list of dismissals that would result 
in a PLRA strike). 
346. See Bock, 549 U.S. at 212 (holding that Rule 8 in conjunction with the 
PLRA still only requires prisoners to provide a short and plain statement of their 
claims). 
347. FED. R. CIV. P. 83 (demanding that local court rules must be consistent 
with the Federal Rules). 
348. See Bock, 549 U.S. at 216 (“We conclude that failure to exhaust is an 
affirmative defense under the PLRA, and that inmates are not required to specially 
plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.”).
349. See id. at 212-14 (explaining examples of courts that were wrong for 
deviating from the usual procedural practice for perceived policy concerns). 
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pleading requirement350 by forcing Prison Mike and other prisoners 
to allege exhaustion. While requiring the pro forma complaints is 
inconsistent with the Federal Rules and therefore invalid under 
Rule 83,351 requiring the complaints also impermissibly conflicts with 
the REA by abridging a substantive right.352
2. Pro Forma Complaints Are in Violation of the REA 
Court X’s requirement that Prison Mike answer questions about 
exhaustion in his pro forma complaint is also unlawful because it 
abridges his substantive right to access the courts.353 Under § 2071 of 
the REA, district courts are permitted to make court rules, but those 
rules must be consistent with rules created by the Supreme Court 
pursuant to § 2072 of the REA.354 Section 2072 stipulates that the 
Supreme Court’s “rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right.”355 Reading § 2071 in conjunction with § 2072, it 
follows that a district court’s rule must not “abridge, enlarge or 
modify any substantive right.”356 Court X’s rule unlawfully abridges 
substantive rights because it conflicts with the PLRA and potential 
future legislation from Congress by forcing prisoners to plead 
exhaustion.357 Furthermore, it directly affects how Court X will come 
to its decision358 by forcing Court X to dismiss Prison Mike’s action 
for failure to state a claim—a strike-worthy dismissal—when it 
                                                     
350. See supra notes 173, 175 (providing the court rules and the 
corresponding complaint forms that work in conjunction to require prisoners to 
allege the exhaustion of administrative remedies). 
351. See FED. R. CIV. P. 83 (stating that local rules have no force if they are 
not consistent with the Federal Rules). 
352. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012) (“Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge 
or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no 
further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.”).
353. See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012) (stating that prisoners may be 
denied IFP Status for accruing three dismissals if their complaints were dismissed 
for being frivolous, being malicious, or failing to state a claim). 
354. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (2012). 
355. Id. § 2072(b). 
356. See id. §§ 2071-2072 (combining to foreclose district courts from 
creating rules that interfere with substantive law). 
357. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012) (creating laws dealing with prisoners’
exhaustion of administrative remedies and thereby preempting the courts from doing 
so). 
358. The complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim because the 
complaint, itself, will reveal an affirmative defense. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 
199, 214-16 (2007) (explaining that a finding of an affirmative defense on the face 
of a complaint warrants dismissal for failure to state a claim). 
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otherwise will have had no reason for such a dismissal.359 Finally, 
because Court X’s inclusion of exhaustion questions in the pro forma 
complaint will ultimately cause Prison Mike’s third PLRA strike, the 
pro forma complaint will egregiously eliminate Prison Mike’s
substantive right to access the courts by disqualifying him from 
claiming IFP Status.360
Congress emphasized with its 1988 amendment to the REA 
that the substantive rights limitation is intended to maintain 
separation of powers between Congress and the Court.361 In doing so, 
Congress specified that the REA’s substantive rights limitation 
prohibits courts from creating rules in areas where Congress has 
already passed laws or in areas where Congress is likely to pass laws 
in the future.362 Therefore, congressional acts—such as the 
PLRA363—prohibit the Court from creating rules that address issues 
similar to the issues already addressed by Congress with such laws, 
especially if the court rules conflict with congressional acts.364
Court X’s rule forcing prisoners to answer questions about 
exhaustion in their pro forma complaints transgresses the REA’s
substantive rights limitation365 because it conflicts with the PLRA as 
interpreted by the Court in Bock.366 Because Congress substantially 
addresses prisoners’ exhaustion of administrative remedies with the 
PLRA, Congress reserved for itself the authority to create rules 
regarding the exhaustion and thereby prohibited the courts from 
creating such rules.367 Therefore, Court X usurped Congress’s
authority when it created the rule requiring pro forma complaints that 
prompt prisoners to discuss the exhaustion of administrative 
remedies.368 Furthermore, according to the Court in Bock, when 
                                                     
359. Assuming Prison Mike’s complaint includes a short and plain statement 
of his claim, it will satisfy Rule 8. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8.  
360. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012) (barring prisoners from claiming IFP 
Status if they accrue three PLRA strikes). 
361. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-422, at 21 (1985). 
362. Id.
363. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012). 
364. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-422, at 21. 
365. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012) (“Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge 
or modify any substantive right.”).
366. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216-17 (2007) (explaining that 
Congress did not intend for the PLRA to require prisoners to allege exhaustion in 
their complaints). 
367. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (creating law that deals with prisoners’ 
exhaustion of administrative remedies); H.R. REP. NO. 99-422, at 21. 
368. See supra notes 173, 175 (working in conjunction to require prisoners to 
allege the exhaustion of administrative remedies). 
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Congress passed the PLRA, it did not intend for prisoners to be 
required to allege the exhaustion of administrative remedies in their 
complaints.369 Contrary to congressional intent as described by the 
Court, Court X’s pro forma complaint requirement forces prisoners 
to allege exhaustion in their complaints.370 Additionally, the Court in 
Bock determined that Congress did not intend for prisoners to incur 
PLRA strikes for failing to exhaust administrative remedies.371
Meanwhile, exhaustion questions within Court X’s pro forma 
complaint will directly cause Prison Mike to incur a PLRA strike for 
failing to exhaust his administrative remedies.372 Exhaustion 
questions in the pro forma complaint form will cause this result for 
Prison Mike because they will force him to include the affirmative 
defense of failure to exhaust in his complaint, which will result in his 
complaint being dismissed for failure to state a claim.373 Court X’s
collective infringements on congressional power show that Court X’s
inclusion of exhaustion questions in its pro forma complaints 
oversteps the boundaries that Congress set with the REA374 and the 
PLRA.375
The Court provided its own interpretation of the REA’s
boundaries with its decision in Shady Grove.376 In that case, Allstate 
challenged Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—a rule 
that allows multiple plaintiffs to join their claims in a class action 
against a single defendant—arguing that it negatively impacts 
defendants’ substantive rights because it causes plaintiffs to bring 
lawsuits when they would have otherwise abstained from filing 
suit.377 The Court provided the following enigmatic language for 
determining when a rule is invalid: A rule is invalid if “it alters ‘the 
rules of decision by which [the] court will adjudicate . . . rights’” of 
                                                     
369. Bock, 549 U.S. at 216-17. 
370. See supra notes 173, 175 (working in conjunction to require prisoners to 
allege the exhaustion of administrative remedies). 
371. See Bock, 549 U.S. at 216-17 (explaining that Congress did not intend 
for the PLRA to require prisoners to allege exhaustion in their complaints). 
372. See supra note 174 (providing examples of prisoners using complaints 
that required them to discuss their exhaustion of administrative remedies and 
thereby causing them to incur PLRA strikes). 
373. See supra note 174.  
374. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2072 (2012).
375. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012). 
376. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 
393, 406-07 (2010). 
377. Id. at 408. 
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the parties.378 While the Court’s language here is confusing and 
unclear, the Court’s reasoning seems to provide a more useable 
framework for determining whether a court rule is permissible under 
the REA.379 In rejecting Allstate’s argument, the Court explained that 
Rule 23 does not go beyond the REA’s substantive rights limitation 
because it does not change the plaintiffs’ claims or the defendants’
rights.380 The Court explained that Rule 23 is permissible because it 
merely changes the process by which claims are brought before a 
court, but has no bearing on a court’s decision.381 Therefore, under 
the reasoning from Shady Grove, a rule impermissibly abridges 
substantive rights when it changes a plaintiff’s claim or a defendant’s
right, or when it changes how the judge will adjudicate the case.382
The inclusion of exhaustion questions in Court X’s pro forma 
complaints is invalid under the Shady Grove Court’s interpretation of 
the REA’s substantive rights limitation383 because it will change the 
outcome of Court X’s decision regarding Prison Mike. While the 
Court in Shady Grove upheld Rule 23 because it allows for the 
consolidation of claims without changing the ultimate outcome of 
those claims,384 questions about exhaustion in Court X’s pro forma 
complaints will directly cause Prison Mike’s otherwise adequate 
complaint385 to be dismissed for failure to state a claim.386 Assuming 
Prison Mike provides a short and plain statement of his claim—
without having to use the pro forma complaint that asks him about 
his exhaustion of administrative remedies—his complaint could not 
be dismissed for a failure to state a claim.387 Conversely, by 
                                                     
378. See id. at 407 (first alteration in original) (quoting Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. 
Murphee, 326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946)). There is still an ongoing debate over how to 
define substantive rights. Freer, supra note 259 at 453-54 (discussing the ongoing 
confusion about the substantive rights limitation). 
379. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407-08 (“[N]one [of the procedural rules 
in question] altered the rights themselves, the available remedies, or the rules of 
decision by which the court adjudicated either.”).
380. Id.  
381. See id. (holding that Rule 23 “undeniably regulated only the process for 
enforcing . . . rights”).
382. See id. at 406-08 (providing rationale to help clarify the substantive 
rights limitation).
383. Id.
384. See id.  
385. This scenario assumes Prison Mike provides a short and plain statement 
of his claim pursuant to Rule 8(a). FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).  
386. See supra note 174 (providing examples to demonstrate how this will 
occur). 
387. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). 
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answering questions about exhaustion in the pro forma complaint, he 
will reveal the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust, which will 
cause him to have his complaint dismissed for failure to state a 
claim.388 While, without answering questions about exhaustion, 
Prison Mike may ultimately lose on his claim due to his failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies,389 the distinction between these two 
types of losses for Prison Mike is meaningful because, of the two, 
only a dismissal for failure to state a claim is grounds for a PLRA 
strike.390 Because questions about exhaustion in Court X’s pro forma 
complaint will change the way Court X adjudicates Prison Mike’s
rights—namely, causing Court X to dismiss Prison Mike’s action for 
failure to state a claim—it goes beyond altering the process by which 
claims are brought before the court.391 Therefore, under the Supreme 
Court’s characterization of the REA392 in Shady Grove,393 the 
inclusion of exhaustion questions in Court X’s pro forma complaint 
is invalid because it abridges Prison Mike’s substantive rights. 
Finally, Congress stipulated in its 1988 amendment to the REA 
that a court rule is invalid if it attempts to regulate procedure but has 
an effect on substantive rights.394 Congress created this amendment in 
response to the Court’s jurisprudence, which upheld rules regulating 
substantive rights so long as the rules also regulated procedure.395
Admittedly, all procedural rules may affect substantive rights to 
some degree,396 a fact that has been the impetus for much debate.397
However, because Congress explicitly prohibited court rules from 
                                                     
388. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212-14 (2007) (explaining that a 
complaint revealing an affirmative defense should be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim). Such a dismissal is grounds for a PLRA strike. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012).
389. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (allowing for defendants to claim affirmative 
defenses in responsive pleadings). 
390. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (listing the grounds for a PLRA strike and 
including a failure to state a claim on that list). 
391. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 
393, 406-07 (2010) (upholding Rule 23 because it did not go beyond altering the 
process by which claims are brought before courts). 
392. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). 
393. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 406-07.
394. H.R. REP. NO. 99-422, at 20-21 (1985). 
395. See, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) (holding that court 
rules could regulate substantive law so long as they were intended to regulate 
procedure). 
396. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407 (explaining that most procedures 
have some effect on substantive rights). 
397. See Freer, supra note 259, at 453-54 (discussing the ongoing debate 
over the substantive rights limitation). 
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affecting substantive rights,398 there should be some degree where an 
incidental effect can be adequately egregious to render a rule invalid, 
even if the court that created the rule intended it to regulate 
procedure.399
The inclusion of exhaustion questions found in Court X’s pro 
forma complaint so significantly abridges Prisoner Mike’s right to 
access the courts that it must violate the REA’s substantive rights 
limitation.400 Congress created IFP Status to ensure that indigent 
litigants—such as Prison Mike—are not denied the right to access 
the courts.401 While Congress has the authority to deny this right—as
it did under certain circumstances with the three strikes provision of 
the PLRA402—courts should not be permitted to create rules that 
eliminate this right.403 By answering questions about exhaustion in 
the pro forma complaint, Prison Mike will reveal the affirmative 
defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies on the face of 
his complaint.404 Such an affirmative defense appearing on the face 
of his complaint will warrant the dismissal of his complaint for 
failure to state a claim, even if his complaint suffers no other 
deficiencies.405 Prison Mike will therefore incur a PLRA strike that 
will disqualify him from claiming IFP Status.406 Without the ability 
to claim IFP Status, Prison Mike will be denied his right to access 
the courts.407 In sum, the inclusion of questions about exhaustion in 
Court X’s pro forma complaint has the direct effect of eliminating 
Prison Mike’s substantive right to access the courts by causing him a 
PLRA strike that will disqualify him for IFP Status.408 Because the 
right Court X’s rule abridges—the right to use IFP Status to access 
                                                     
398. H.R. REP. NO. 99-422, at 20-21. 
399. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (standing generally for 
the proposition that undesirable effects can be grounds for a law’s
unconstitutionality, even when the consequence is unintended). 
400. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). 
401. Id. § 1915(g); see also Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 451 (3d Cir. 
2013) (discussing congressional purpose for creating the IFP statute). 
402. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (2012).
403. H.R. REP. NO. 99-422, at 21 (explaining that the courts should not 
regulate areas of law already regulated by Congress). 
404. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 214-16 (2007) (explaining that a 
complaint can be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it reveals an affirmative 
defense on its face). 
405. See id.  
406. This being his third strike, he will be disqualified from IFP Status. 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(g). 
407. See id. 
408. See id.  
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the courts—was affirmatively conferred by Congress, Court X’s rule 
goes beyond the limitations imposed by the REA and is therefore 
impermissible.409
3. Rectified Complaint Forms 
The part of Court X’s pro forma complaints that requires 
prisoners to allege exhaustion410 should be eliminated. Court X 
should still be permitted to use pro forma complaints, but they 
should not include any questions asking prisoners about the 
exhaustion of administrative remedies.411 Rather, the pro forma 
complaints should require only pertinent information for 
identification, as well as an area for prisoners to make short and plain 
statements of their claims.412 Such pro forma complaints—already 
used by several other federal district courts413—would be consistent 
with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules414 and would not abridge prisoners’
substantive rights.415 Furthermore, eliminating the part of these 
complaints that requires prisoners to allege exhaustion would 
eliminate the unintended consequence of prisoners incurring PLRA 
strikes for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies.416
CONCLUSION
While the Court decisively held in Bock that the PLRA does 
not go so far as to create a heightened pleading requirement for 
prisoners, some district courts have been requiring prisoners to allege 
                                                     
409. See id. § 2072. 
410. See supra note 205 (providing examples of the complaint forms that 
have prisoners discuss exhaustion). 
411. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE W. DIST. OF MICH., FORM TO BE
USED BY A PRISONER IN FILING A COMPLAINT UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (n.d.), http://www.miwd.uscourts.gov/sites/miwd/files/cmpref.pdf 
(providing an example of a pro forma complaint that does not require prisoners to 
plead exhaustion); U.S. DIST. COURT DIST. OF MINN., PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS 
COMPLAINT (n.d.), http://www.mnd.uscourts.gov/Pro-Se/ProSeForms/ProSe-Civil-
Rights-Complaint.pdf (same); U.S. DIST. COURT DIST. OF N.H., INSTRUCTIONS FOR 
FILING A COMPLAINT BY A PRISONER UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 (n.d.), http://www.nhd.uscourts.gov/pdf/Inmate%20Complaint% 
20USDCNH-11.pdf (same). 
412. See supra note 411.
413. See supra note 411. 
414. FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
415. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
416. See supra Section III.A (providing an example of how this occurs).  
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exhaustion in their complaints.417 These district courts have 
circumvented the Court’s holding by mandating pro forma 
complaints that require prisoners to discuss their exhaustion within 
the complaints.418 Consequently, prisoners are having their 
complaints dismissed for failure to state a claim, which causes them 
to incur PLRA strikes.419 The pro forma complaints that require 
prisoners to discuss their exhaustion of administrative remedies are 
inconsistent with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules as interpreted by the 
Court in Bock420 because they create a more burdensome pleading 
requirement, and they abridge prisoners’ substantive rights to access 
the courts—a violation of the substantive rights limitation of the 
REA.421 A public-interest group should therefore litigate on behalf of 
a prisoner—like Prison Mike—and seek to eliminate the portions of 
the forms that ask prisoners about their exhaustion of administrative 
remedies.422
                                                     
417. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007) (holding that prisoners should 
not be made to “demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints”).
418. See supra notes 173, 294 (exhibiting the local court rules and the 
corresponding pro forma complaints that require prisoners to discuss the exhaustion 
of administrative remedies). 
419. See supra note 174 (providing examples of prisoners incurring PLRA 
strikes as a result of their use of pro forma complaints). 
420. See Bock, 549 U.S. at 212-17.  
421. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2072 (2012).
422. See supra Subsection IV.B.3. 
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